A section of the South Korean corvette “Cheonan” lifted out of the water; the ship was cut in half by the explosion

Israel did a false flag in March 26, 2010 that was blamed on North Korea . 46 of the 104 sailors aboard a South Korean corvette called “Cheonan” (pronounced “Choh-nahn”) died in this false flag when the ship exploded and sank.

A nuclear false flag attack on carrier strike group?

north korea false flag australia apunked2

There is a high risk that Israel will perform another false flag that is similar to the Cheonan false flag. The US carrier strike group is currently heading to the waters near the North Korean coast (April 25th, 2017).

Israel may have attached nuclear explosives to one or more carriers while the carriers were docked in Singapore. This may have been the reason why the carrier was diverted to Singapore. Singapore is a nation that has close ties, including military ties, with Israel. There is a notably significant Mossad presence in Singapore. The U.S. media reported that while in Singapore, the USS Carl Vinson did exercises with the Australian Navy.

Is the USS Carl Vinson a floating nuclear bomb?

Other carriers are joining the USS Vinson. When the carriers are near North Korea, the nuclear explosives may be detonated, and the subsequent explosion blamed on a nuclear missile fired from a North Korean submarine. If this scenario does eventuate, it could be used as a pretext for the U.S. to attack North Korea with nuclear weapons, initiating a nuclear war between the US and North Korea.

North Korea may be able to fight a conventional war against the U.S. and survive but it won’t be able to fight one-on-one a nuclear war with the U.S.  This might be a reason why the perpetrators may want a nuclear war to occur on the peninsula in preference to a conventional war.

Israel has to get the U.S. to attack North Korea before May 9th. This is the date of the South Korean elections. The frontrunner is Moon Jae-In. He is ahead of the runner up by 10 points. Moon Jae-In has stated he will sign a peace treaty with North Korea if he is elected. He has said “there is nothing more dangerous than having others decide our fate”.

After he is elected, there is very little chance that South Korea would agree to North Korea being attacked, and the president is likely to take actions, such as re-opening the Gaesong industrial complex, to cement ties with North Korea and further the cause of peaceful reunification with North Korea.

Read how North Korea was framed in the Malaysian Airport incident.


USS Carl Vinson

Does North Korean submarines shoot ballistic missiles out of the water? 

In the May 2015 news report, experts claim the video of an underwater submarine launch of a ballistic missile was modified.


  • reflection of the exhaust flame did not match with the actual exhaust flame seen coming from the missile
  • Photos are different. In one photo shown on state TV, a missile high in the sky leaves a trail of white smoke. But in other photos from state media, there is no white smoke. This could mean that these photos were of different missiles that had different propulsion systems.

“[It] seems sensible to assume that any North Korean SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic missile] capability is still a very long time in the future, if it will ever surface,” Markus Schiller and Robert Schmucker, of Schmucker Technologie, told Reuters.

James Winnefeld, a US navy admiral, said that Pyongyang is still “many years” from developing submarine-launched ballistic missiles.


It published photographs of Kim Jong-un watching as missiles were apparently fired from a submarine beneath the ocean surface. However these may be faked photographs. 

Adapted from The Telegraph

How the Cheonan attack was done:

Israeli commandos infiltrated the security of Cheonan and attached explosives to the Cheonan ship while it was docked in South Korea. At the appointed time, Israel detonated the explosive charges on the ship by remote control detonation from a drone. The drone remained in the area for at least half an hour to monitor developments.
A torpedo was planted on the sea floor near the vicinity of the corvette as part of the preparation for the false flag. This rocket was later found during investigations.

The torpedo is unlikely to have been a North Korean one 


  1. Schematics of the torpedo found on the sea bed do not match with North Korean torpedoes
  2. The torpedo was of German manufacture
  3. The writing on the torpedo was written over the rust on the torpedo
  4. The writing did not match North Korean language
  5. No torpedo was picked up by sonar prior to the explosion
  6. North Korea vehemently denied it was behind the attack and requested access to the evidence, which was denied

Schematics do not match North Korean torpedoes

There are 5 clear differences in the design of these weapons:

1. “A” & “D” –  In the diagram of the North Korean torpedo (schematic at top), you can see it has a smaller hub than the actual torpedo that was recovered.

2. * “B” – The actual shape of the propellers in the schematic of the North Korean torpedo is very different to the shape of the propellers in the recovered torpedo. You can see a notch in the diagram above that doesn’t exist in the propeller below. The overall shape of the blades are vastly different as well, with regards to both the front and the rear propeller sets.
Now, the last point proves they are not the same torpedo.

3.  “C” – As you can plainly see, the stabilizers (or propulsion system?) in the schematic of a North Korean torpedo above are clearly shown IN FRONT of the separation plate. However, looking at the torpedo that was recovered, the same stabilizer (or propulsion system) is housed BEHIND the separation plate (separating the body and the tail section of the torpedo).

4. The shape of the fins in the schematic of the North Korean torpedo and the torpedo that was recovered from the ocean bed is different.

5. The axle of the North Korean torpedo is straight whereas the axle in the recovered torpedo is tapered.

Adapted from The Sinking of the Cheonan: We are being lied to

The torpedo was of German manufacture

On May 6th, 2010 a report conducted by South Korea and others came out that said the torpedo’s metal and explosive residue had a German origin.

The team of South Korean and foreign investigators found traces of explosives on several parts of the sunken ship. The investigators also discovered pieces of composite metal used in such torpedoes, according to the South Korea’s Yonhap news agency, quoting a senior government official.

… The metallic debris and chemical residue appear to be consistent with a type of torpedo made in Germany, indicating the North may have been trying to disguise its involvement by avoiding arms made by allies China and Russia, Yonhap quoted the official as saying. REUTERS News Agency

More from The Sinking of the Cheonan: We are being lied to.

The author of The Sinking of the Cheonan: We are being lied to states that the torpedo that was recovered from the ocean floor resembles the German-made DM2 A-3. This torpedo can be upgraded to the DM2 A-4 version.


German-made torpedo DM2

In a paper I wrote yesterday I questioned whether or not the German-made DM2-A3 looked more like what was found.

“The DM2 A-3 version is also used by the Norwegian Ula class (German Type 210 subs) with an option for a later upgrade). The Italian Type 212 B submarines use the DM2 A-4 version. The Israeli Dolphin-class (German Type S-300) are also being equipped with the DM2 A-4 Torpedo.” 

The German navy, Italian navy, Norwegian navy and Israeli navy all use the German-made DM2 A-3 or DM2 A-4 torpedo.

Berlin does not sell torpedoes to North Korea, however, Germany does maintain a close joint submarine and submarine weapons development program with Israel. Asia Times

Israel bought German-made torpedoes

Germany worked with Israel manufacture torpedoes according to this article written in 1995.

Electric Fuel Ltd., an Israeli electric battery manufacturer, said in late June it will help German defense contractor STN Atlas Elektronik GmbH develop a torpedo for the German navy.

Also, in this report, written in 2002, Germany had an armaments cooperation deal with Israel, in which many weapons and submarines were supplied to Israel. This cooperation in arms goes back to 1955/56.

German-Israeli armaments cooperation can be traced back to 1955/56 when Germany exported two coastal patrol boats to Israel. German-Israeli Arms Cooperation CAST: Eksport Vooruzheniy No. 6, Nov/Dec 2002

This cooperation includes the sale of German torpedoes to Israel. Israel chose to buy the DM 2A3 torpedo from Germany. This torpedo resembles the torpedo found on the sea bed in the Cheonan incident.

Even regarding “minor” purchases of subsystems, Israel has to resort either to US funds or to exchange-trade solutions. When it came to the selection of heavyweight torpedoes for the submarines, Israel at first wanted to buy US torpedoes Mk.48. When the US government declined, Israel chose the STN Atlas Elektronik Torpedo DM 2A3 export version Seahake. German-Israeli Arms Cooperation

Comparison of the German-made DM2 A-4 torpedo, recovered torpedo and schematics of North Korean torpedo

The shape of the propeller of the North Korean torpedo differs from the shape of the propeller of the German-made DM2 and the recovered rusty torpedo.

DM 2A4-comparison-torpedo.jpg

German-made DM2 A-4 at the top; recovered torpedo found on the sea floor; schematics of a North Korean torpedo at bottom.

There was writing on top of the rust on the torpedo


Readers of the website Willy Loman: We are being lied to about Cheonan are providing photographic evidence that the writing on the torpedo was written after the torpedo part was taken out of the water.

Mr. Shin was one of the investigators assigned to help with the official investigation of the sinking of the Cheonan. He is now being investigated for disagreeing with the “official results“.

Shin said Wednesday in a lecture he titled “Can we trust the Cheonan probe outcome?”
“The magnified photo of the evidence showed that the marking was written on the rusted surface,” he said. “If it were the North who marked it, the marking should have been written on a smooth surface.”

Below are the images of the writing of “No. 1” (1번) written on the torpedo part. You can clearly see in the progression of images that the marker ink was laid on top of some of the rust. You can also see where an area was cleaned prior to the writing.






This is the website the following images came from. http://bbs1.agora.media.daum.net/gaia/do/debate/read?bbsId=D115&articleId=1004379 The website also shows how the build-up on the propeller blades could not have occurred in only a month and a half.


Evidence of cleaning in the area of the writing

There is evidence that there was an attempt to clean the area of rust. The area of suspected cleaning is outlined below.

#ilbon #northkoreanlanguage

The writing of “No. 1” is not North Korean language


According to Kim Myong Chol, who is referred to as the unofficial spokesman of the North Korean government, the writing of “No. 1” is consistent with South Korean language but not North Korean language. South Koreans write “No. 1” as “il bon” (1번), but North Koreans write it as “il ho” (1호).

The investigation team produced what it termed “conclusive evidence”: the eye-catching hand-written Korean markings “ilbon” or “No 1″ in English found on the propulsion section of the used torpedo allegedly recovered from the sea bed.

This turns out to be most inconclusive and counter-productive, calling into serious question the credibility of the findings. The use of “ilbon” in Korean script – not in Chinese characters – may look like North Korean writing, which is distinctly different from what is written in South Korea.

But native North Koreans use “ilho” for the English “No 1″. “Ilbon” is what South Koreans would use, although North Korean street addresses more often than often not do contain numerals like “ilbon“.

Asia Times

The discrepancy suggests that North Korea was framed. The perpetrator deliberately wrote “No. 1” in Hangeul (Korean characters) on top of the rust, not knowing that the North Korean language differs slightly from South Korean language.

Letter from South Korean Government: Confirms North Korean language different

The South Korean Government wrote a letter to the U.N. Security Council. In this letter are the photographs below. On the left is the CHT-02D, the torpedo that was recovered from the seabed in the Cheonan incident. “No. 1” is written as “1번” (“1 bon”). On the right is an torpedo that is alleged to be of North Korean origin that had been previously obtained by the South Korean Government. The writing of “No. 4” on the alleged North Korean torpedo is “4호” (“4 ho”).

South Korean letter: URL | DPRK S 2010 281 SKorea Letter and Cheonan Report


On the left is the torpedo found in the Cheonan attack. On the right is a torpedo that the South Korean Government claims is of North Korean make and that it had previously obtained. The language on the two torpedoes is different. Pictures are from a South Korean Government letter to the U.N. Security Council. 

The alleged torpedo eluded sonar

In an article for Asia Times (see below), the author Myong Chol notes that the Chinese government did not accept the findings of the UN and stated that there were suspicions the Cheonan sinking was a false flag incident.

The main points that are put forward for this view, according to two American websites, are (Did an American Mine Sink South Korean Ship?):

To summarize the points:

  • The site of the Cheonan sinking was relatively noiseless. It was near a naval base, on Baengnyeong Island (“Baeng-nyeong Island”), that conducts anti-submarine warfare, such as detecting the presence of enemy submarines. The conditions there were perfect for picking up the slightest agitation, such as the firing of a torpedo or the movements of a nearby submarine.
  • A flotilla of ships, led by an Aegis warship, was in South Korean waters at the time of the sinking.
  • The Cheonan sinking occurred in the aftermath of the March 11-18 Foal Eagle Exercise, which included anti-submarine maneuvers by a joint U.S.-South Korean squadron of five missile ships.
  • One of the ships in the flotilla was USNS Savor which was a mine-laying ship. It was located close to the naval base on Baengnyeong Island.
  • Berlin does not sell torpedoes to North Korea, however, Germany does maintain a close joint submarine and submarine weapons development program with Israel.”

From Asia Times:

Fact One: Baengnyeong Island hosts a Secret Joint US-South Korean Naval Base for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations. Absent civilian traffic around it, “the noiseless conditions are near-perfect for picking up the slightest agitation, for example from a torpedo and any submarine that might fire it”. The joint US-South Korean naval base is staffed by American and South Korean naval special operation force personnel.

Fact Two: An Aegis ship-led US flotilla was operating in the South Korean waters in question at the time of the sinking of the South Korean warship.

Fact Three: The US flotilla included a mine-laying USNS Savor, stationed close to Baengnyeong Island.

Contrary to the belief that the ship was under the command of the Seventh Fleet, the NAM story noted that the USNS Salvor was “controlled by the innocuous-sounding Military Sealift Command and is closely connected with the Office of Naval Intelligence since their duties include secret operations such as retrieving weapons from sunken foreign ships, scouting harbor channels and laying mines, as when the Salvor trained Royal Thai Marine divers in mine-laying in the Gulf of Thailand in 2006, for example.”

Fact Four: The US Navy SEALs “maintains a sampling of European torpedoes for sake of plausible deniability for false-flag attacks. Also, Berlin does not sell torpedoes to North Korea, however, Germany does maintain a close joint submarine and submarine weapons development program with Israel.”

Asia Times


Baengnyeong Island. The Cheonan was sunk 5 km from the naval base. 

China stated that there were strong grounds to suspect North Korea was innocent

In an article in New America Media, it was reported that:

In the recent U.S.-China strategic talks in Shanghai and Beijing, the Chinese side dismissed the official scenario presented by the Americans and their South Korean allies as not credible. This conclusion was based on an independent technical assessment by the Chinese military, according to a Beijing-based military affairs consultant to the People Liberation Army.


Initial assessment: North Korean attack unlikely

  • No suspicious activities or movements detected before and after the ship sank.
  • North Korean warship’s infiltration would have been easily revealed as site of incident was only 10-12 kilometers from the Northern Limit Line (de facto sea border between North Korea and South Korea) where vigilance is high and monitoring and surveillance activities are carried out
  • Waters where the corvette sank is shallow, which would make the operation of a North Korean war ship difficult

Some features of the incident:

– all electricity was cut off at the time of the explosion, causing communications to shut down except cell phone operation

– internal shock can’t be ruled out

– the ship was split in half by the explosion and the back half immediately sank

– the explosion and sinking of back half happened in two minutes


Baengnyeong Island (“Baeng-nyong” Island) is a joint US/ROK forward intelligence naval base that specializes in anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare and is the base for USN Seals. –Peter Eyre – Middle East Consultant

From Korea Herald (March 27, 2010):

[Commander] Choi Won-il, who led the sunken ship, said the explosion appears to have been caused by “internal or external shocks.”

“The exact cause of the explosion can be verified after the ship is salvaged and a thorough investigation is carried out,” he said. “The ship was broken into two parts and the rear of the ship abruptly sank…

During an emergency session of the National Assembly’s defense committee, Lee Gi-sik, chief of the Defense Ministry’s intelligence operations, said that captain Choi reported the situation to the chief of naval operations with his mobile phone right before the ship sank.

“All electricity was cut off at the time so the captain reported the situation with his cell phone,” Lee said.

“There was a big detonation and the engine stopped and the electricity was cut off. I went up to the deck and couldn’t see the stern of the ship there. All happened within two minutes,” the captain was quoted as saying by Rep. Kim Hak-song of the ruling Grand National Party who chairs the committee.

Some reports earlier said that the government presumes that the possibility of North Korea’s involvement in the incident is low.

According to them, as the Northern Limit Line, which serves as a de facto sea border, is about 10-12 kilometers away from where the ship sank, a North Korean warship’s infiltration would have been easily revealed. They added that the waters where the ship sank were relatively shallow, meaning the operation of a North Korean warship would be difficult.

The U.S. forces in Korea are also said to presume that the possibility of North Korea’s involvement is low as there were no suspicious activities or movements detected before and after the ship sank.

“The exact cause of the incident has yet to be verified, but if we sum up investigations conducted by related ministries, the North does not appear to be involved in the incident,” a government source was quoted by Yonhap News as saying.


Radar picked up significant activity – UAV?

The radar of one of the ships in the Joint Strike Command picked up some activity in the air 27 minutes after the explosion, and the ship fired on the “radar contact”. This was said to have been birds, but others said this was unlikely as “the Navy’s patrol ships are equipped with sophisticated radar devices.”


9:30 pm Friday: Blast occurred ; 9:57 pm: Warning shot at unidentified object

The possibility that a UAV was deployed in the vicinity of the Cheonan around the time of the attack in order to:

  1. Detonate the explosive on the ship by remote control
  2. Monitor the ship and activities after the explosion

Drones could have been used to detonate the device as probably happened in the 9/11 attacks

Drones could have been employed thus in the same way they are presumed to have been used in the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center.

In the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, it is theorized that helicopter drones could have been flown near the towers to detonate the explosive devices within the buildings by remote control (see “Plane Missile”). In the same way, UAVs may have controlled the detonation of the explosives that had been pre-planted in the Cheonan. 

There was much helicopter activity around the World Trade Center Twin Towers during the attacks. Helicopters were flying near the Twin Towers at the times of detonations and shortly prior to the detonations. If they were drones, they could have been used to effect the remote detonation of the explosives in the Twin Towers. Signals could have been relayed from a ground control station to the drone helicopters, and then the signal to fire could have been sent from the drones to the explosives within the buildings.

From Korea Times:

Another lingering question is why a nearby patrol ship fired a warning shot toward the North soon after the tragic sinking.

In this regard, the JSC said one of their ships had fired on a radar contact that turned out to be a flock of birds.

Some military experts, however, point out that the chance of firing warning shots at a flock of birds is unlikely, as the Navy’s patrol ships are equipped with sophisticated radar devices.

Korea Times

Unmanned aerial vehicles

From a video by Israeli drone company Malat:







Future planned drone from Lockheed Martin (2007)

VIDEO: Lockheed Cormorant unmanned aircraft (in development, video’s date is 2007) Youtube

How the attack could have happened (speculation)

Mini-submarines (“human torpedoes”)

An Israeli submarine was sent to the South Korean region. Israel is known to possess Dolphin class submarines. It purchased its first German-made Dolphin class submarine in 1999. A mini submarine, either a one-person or two-person submarine, was sent to the corvette, which was floating about 5 km off the coast off South Korea.

The mini submarine is often cigar-shaped and is often called a “human torpedo” because of its torpedo-like shape. (Image from Maiale-Pig-Human-Torpedo)

Limpet mine

The mini submarine was used to transport an explosive, possibly an attachable explosive, like a limpet mine.

limpet mine on hull-mdf.jpg

Image of a limpet mine attached to a ship’s hull. (Image taken from video)

Once the corvette was reached, the explosive was attached to the under-surface of the corvette.

Too small to be picked up by radar

The mini submarine would be too small to be picked up by sonar. It is not known if the South Korean ship had been equipped with a hydrophone.

Schematics of North Korean torpedoes

Israelis knew the schematics of North Korean torpedoes because North Korean ships had been intercepted in the past carrying torpedoes, which were probably headed for an ally nation of North Korea, as part of a sale of arms. Printed schematics of North Korean submarines could have been obtained in this way.

Additionally, South Korea had access to the schematics as well as they had captured a North Korean torpedo in the past, as revealed in the letter South Korean authorities sent to the U.N. about the Cheonan incident. As it can be presumed that South Korean intelligence is shared with the US, it can also be assumed that anything that the US has access to, the Israeli intelligence service has the same access to. A torpedo of German manufacture was used for this operation as it was a close match to the schematics of a North Korean torpedo.

“No. 1” not written in North Korean language

On a separate trip, the mini-submarine dropped off a German-made torpedo with “No. 1” written on it (but the language did not match North Korean language), on top of the rust, in the vicinity of the corvette, where the torpedo sank to the ocean floor.

un-letter-north-korean-torpedo-hangeul (2).jpg

Note the words “No. 4” written in Hangeul (Korean script). 

un-letter-north-korean-torpedo-hangeul (3).jpg

The words “No. 1” looks as if it was written to emulate the writing on the previously obtained North Korean torpedo. However, if it was, the translation into North Korean language is wrong. 


After the explosive device had been attached to the ship and the rusty torpedo had been placed on the seafloor, when it came time for the device’s detonation, a UAV was sent to the ship, that was floating 5 km from the island of Baengnyeong to do the task. Bigger than a seagull but much smaller than a small ordinary plane, the unmanned aircraft was flown within the vicinity of the ship, and a radio signal was sent to it to execute the firing of the explosive device.


From Malat Industries

Operation Trojan

In 1986, the Israelis did a covert operation called “Operation Trojan”. This operation involved the use of two-man submarines called “pigs”. These submarines were cigar-shaped and were used to transport the “trojan” (a communications device), a cylinder that was six-feet long and seven-inches in diameter.

The cigar-shaped mini-subs were nicknamed “pigs”. 

The following is an extract from Victor Ostrovsky’s “The Other Side of Deception“, a book about the Mossad.

[In 1986] The commandos were charged with the task of planting the Trojan device in Tripoli, Libya.

On the night of February 17-18, two Israeli missile boats, the SAAR 4-class Moledet, armed with Harpoon and Gabriel surface-to-surface missiles, among other weaponry, and the Geula, a Hohit-class missile boat with a helicopter pad and regular SAAR 4-class armament, conducted what seemed like a routine patrol of the Mediterranean, heading for the Sicilian channel and passing just outside the territorial waters of Libya. Just north of Tripoli, the warships, which were visible to radar both in Tripoli and on the Italian island of Lampedusa, slowed down to about four knots – just long enough to allow a team of twelve naval commandos in four wet submarines nicknamed “pigs” and two low-profiled speedboats called “birds” to disembark. The pigs could carry two commandos each and all their fighting gear. The birds, equipped with an MG 7.62-caliber machine gun mounted over the bow and an array of antitank shoulder-carried missiles, could facilitate six commandos each, while towing the empty pigs. The birds brought the pigs as close to the shore as possible, thus cutting down the distance the pigs would have to travel on their own. (The pigs were submersible and silent but relatively slow.)

Two miles off the Libyan coast, the lights of Tripoli could be seen glistening in the southeast. Eight commandos slipped quietly into the pigs and headed for shore. The birds stayed behind at the rendezvous point, ready to take action should the situation arise. Once they reached the beach, the commandos left their cigar-like transporters submerged in the shallow water and headed inland, carrying a dark green Trojan cylinder six feet long and seven inches in diameter. It took two men to carry it.

A gray van was parked on the side of the road about one hundred feet from the water, on the coastal highway leading from Sabratah to Tripoli and on to Benghazi. There was hardly any traffic at that time of night. The driver of the van seemed to be repairing a flat tire. He stopped working as the team approached and opened the back doors of the van. He was a Mossad combatant. Without a word said, four of the men entered the van and headed for the city. The other four returned to the water, where they took a defensive position by the submerged pigs. Their job was to hold this position to ensure an escape route for the team now headed for the city.

“The Other Side of Deception” p. 114, by Victor Ostrovsky


UN Security Council statement did not identify the attacker; Russian Navy did not concur with South Korean and U.S. report

Peter Eyre – 5/4/2013 Galactic Connection

Quote: The ROKS Cheonan sinking occurred on 26 March 2010, when the Cheonan, a Republic of Korea Navy ship carrying 104 personnel, sank off the country’s west coast near Baengnyeong Island in the Yellow Sea, killing 46 seamen. A South Korean-led official investigation carried out by a team of international experts from South Korea, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Sweden presented a summary of its investigation on 20 May 2010, concluding that the warship had been sunk by a North Korean torpedo fired by a midget submarine.

North Korea denied that it was responsible for the sinking. North Korea’s further offer to aid an open investigation was disregarded The Peoples Republic of China dismissed the official scenario presented by South Korea and the United States as not credible. An investigation by the Russian Navy also did not concur with the report. The United Nations Security Council made a Presidential Statement condemning the attack but without identifying the attacker.


Letter from the South Korean Government to the UN Security Council:

URL: http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc9975.doc.htm

Download from here: DPRK S 2010 281 SKorea Letter and Cheonan Report


Baeng-nyeong Island – naval base

Peter Eyre – 5/4/2013  Galactic Connection

Quote: The Cheonan was sunk near Baengnyeong Island, a westernmost spot that is far from the South Korean coast, but opposite the North Korean coast. The island is heavily militarized and within artillery fire range of North Korean coastal defenses, which lie across a narrow channel.

…this particular area is a very sophisticated training ground for Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) and accordingly would be extremely well protected against any intrusion by other vessel and or submarines. It is also important to keep in mind that this same area is also carefully monitored by China and Russia who have some very sophisticated equipment and apparatus to watch over every aspect of the Korean Peninsular.

The sinking of the South Korean Corvette Cheonan took place on the evening of March the 26th 2010 at 2122 local time in total darkness. The location was just offshore on the southwest corner of Baengnyeong Island which sits very close to the border with North Korea. The island is a hub for the South Korean military and is also a very active area for war games with many other nations, especially the United States Navy which I will explain below.

Baengnyeong Island is a Secret Joint US-South Korean Naval Base for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations. The surrounding waters are relatively void of any civilian vessels making it a perfect location for a multitude of naval exercises. What is more important is the solitude and silence in its waters making it a good location to install sonar listening devices which one normally associated with areas used for submarine training and anti submarine training. One could also assume that it would also be a good location for mine laying and mine sweeping activities as well as regular exercise in submarine hunting by both surface craft and submarines. Add to this both surface and sub-sea training by the US Navy Seals

It is very important to fully understand that this location would be very heavy protected by Land Sea and Air. The lack of en route traffic would also make it a perfect listening ground for approaching vessels, submarines or any other craft as well as any weapons that were release by a submarine such as a torpedo or underwater launched missile. The joint US-South Korean naval base is staffed by American and South Korean naval special operation force personnel and accordingly uses extremely sophisticated weapons and apparatus.

… Baengnyeong Island hosts a joint US-South Korea military intelligence base and the US Navy SEALS operate out of the base. In addition, four U.S. Navy ships were in the area, part of the joint U.S-South Korean Exercise Foal Eagle, during the sinking of the Cheonan.



Peter Eyre – 5/4/2013  Galactic Connection

Quote: One of the main purposes for increasing tensions on the Korean peninsula was to apply pressure on Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama to reverse course on moving the U.S. Marine Corps base off Okinawa. Hatoyama has admitted that the tensions over the sinking of the Cheonan played a large part in his decision to allow the U.S. Marines to remain on Okinawa.


Cheonan – state-of-the-art sonar

Peter Eyre – 5/4/2013  Galactic Connection

Quote: The Cheonan, an ASW corvette, was decked out with state-of-the-art sonar, plus it was operating in waters with extensive hydrophone sonar arrays and acoustic underwater sensors. There is no South Korean sonar or audio evidence of a torpedo, submarine or mini-sub in the area. Since there is next to no shipping in the channel, the sea was silent at the time of the sinking.


Four U.S. ships were in the area

Peter Eyre – 5/4/2013  Galactic Connection

Quote: Baengnyeong Island hosts a joint US-South Korea military intelligence base and the US Navy SEALS operate out of the base. In addition, four U.S. Navy ships were in the area, part of the joint U.S-South Korean Exercise Foal Eagle, during the sinking of the Cheonan.


Initial reports: No evidence linking North Korea to the sinking

Peter Eyre – 5/4/2013  Galactic Connection

Quote: [The] Director of the South Korean National Intelligence – Won See-hoon told the South Korean Parliamentary Committee in early April, less than two weeks after the incident that there was no evidence linking North Korea to the sinking.


No torpedo, no warship, no submarine, no semi-submersible detected

Peter Eyre – 5/4/2013  Galactic Connection

Quote: South Korea’s Minister of Defence Kim Tae-young also backed him up by saying that the crew of the stricken corvette had not detected a torpedo.

It was also interesting to learn that the Head of the Marine Operations Office at the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that “No North Korean Warships have been detected in the waters where the accident took place.”

Defense Ministry officials added that they had not detected any North Korean submarines in the area at the time of the incident

When speculation persisted that the Cheonan had been sunk by a North Korean torpedo, the Defense Ministry called another press conference to reiterate “there was no unusual North Korean activities detected at the time of the disaster.”

A ministry spokesman, Won Tae-jae, told reporters that “With regard to this case, no particular activities by North Korean submarines or semi-submarines…have been verified. I am saying again that there were no activities that could be directly linked to” the Cheonan’s sinking.

Rear Admiral Lee, the head of the marine operations office, added that, “We closely watched the movement of the North’s vessels, including submarines and semi-submersibles, at the time of the sinking. But military did not detect any North Korean submarines near the country’s western sea border.”


Article from Asia Times:

Pyongyang: Cheonan was false-flag sinking

By Kim Myong Chol
(an “unofficial” spokesman of Kim Jong-il and North Korea) Jun 4, 2010

With a huge electronic intelligence-gathering machine at its disposal, the Chinese Navy keeps a close watch on the movements of the United States Navy in the West Sea (Yellow Sea). China’s emerging blue-sea navy is confronted with the US Seventh Fleet across the West Sea, the East China Sea and the rest of the Pacific.

It is no wonder then that the Chinese navy’s intelligence arm could piece together an accurate account of the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan with a loss of 46 lives in the early hours of March 26.

The Chinese findings may be one of the reasons why the Chinese government has refused to support American and South Korean demand to join in sanctions against North Korea.

Their leakage indicates that despite its present neutrality, less prudent American or South Korean behavior may well prompt the Chinese government to have the navy make a bombshell official announcement implicating the US Navy.

In a highly significant development, the Chinese navy took the extraordinary step of quietly letting two American Internet sites know the findings of an independent technical assessment its naval intelligence arm made of the corvette’s sinking, which took place about 1 nautical mile (1.9 kilometers) off the south-west coast of Baengnyeong Island in the Yellow Sea.

Chinese findings

One of the US websites was the Washington-based investigative Wayne Madsen Report [1], while the other was New America Media, a California-based website that is the US’s largest coalition of ethnic media with over 2,500 partners [2].

New America Media posted an article on May 26, “Did an American Mine Sink South Korean Ship?”. The Madsen Report article, dated May 28, was entitled “Beijing Suspects False Flag Attack on South Korean Corvette.”

The NAM story said: “In the recent US-China strategic talks in Shanghai and Beijing, the Chinese side dismissed the official scenario presented by the Americans and their South Korean allies as not credible.”

The two articles basically agreed that a US mine ripped the Cheonan in two and sent the hapless South Korean corvette down to Davy Jones’ locker. But they differed in two key aspects; one was the type of the mine used in the friendly-fire attack – limpet or rising – and the other was the nature of the friendly fire, deliberate or inadvertent.

These differences are probably due to Chinese-English translations, identification of the blast or analysis of the motivations behind the incident among Chinese experts.

The New America Media story identified the mine as a rising mine for shallow water operations, calling its launch “an inadvertent release” of a torpedo-firing mine. Rising mines lie on or under the sea floor and are equipped with acoustic sensors so it can rise and explode if a ship or submarine passes within range.

The Chinese term for a torpedo-mine is a “rising mine” and “rocket mine” and the American “captor mine” (MK60 Captor or encapsulated torpedo for deep-water operations) and “mobile mine” (MK67 for shallow water use).

The NAM article did not see any political purpose in the friendly fire but stressed that “any attempt to falsify evidence and engage in a media cover-up for political purposes constitutes tampering, fraud, perjury and possibly treason”.

In striking contrast, the Madsen Report version classified the culprit as a limpet mine, as the name suggests attached to a target by magnets, and defined the friendly fire as “a covert program” deliberately intended to be “a false-flag attack designed to appear as coming from North Korea”.

The MS report made a stunning revelation: “A [US Navy] SEALS diver attached a magnetic mine to the Cheonan, as part of a covert program aimed at influencing public opinion in South Korea, Japan and China.”

The Yomiuri Shimbun reported on May 30 that a morning phone call from US President Barack Obama two days earlier had induced the reluctant Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, who resigned on Wednesday, to keep US Marine Corps air bases in Okinawa and dismiss Mizuho Fukushima, the Social Democratic Party leader, from a cabinet post.

The MS report made the following observation:

One of the main purposes for increasing tensions on the Korean Peninsula was to apply pressure on Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama to reverse course on moving the US Marine Corps base off Okinawa. Hatoyama has admitted that the tensions over the sinking of the Cheonan played a large part in his decision to allow the US Marines to remain on Okinawa. Hatoyama’s decision has resulted in a split in the ruling center-left coalition government, a development welcome in Washington, with Mizuho Fukushima, the Social Democratic Party, leader threatening to bolt the coalition over the Okinawa reversal.

The MS report wrote: “Beijing, satisfied with North Korea’s Kim Jong-il’s claim of innocence after a hurried train trip from Pyongyang to Beijing, suspects the US Navy’s role in the Cheonan’s sinking, with particular suspicion on the role of the [USNS] Salvor.”

The two American stories wrote that Chinese naval intelligence based their suspicions on the following facts:

Fact One: Baengnyeong Island hosts a Secret Joint US-South Korean Naval Base for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations. Absent civilian traffic around it, “the noiseless conditions are near-perfect for picking up the slightest agitation, for example from a torpedo and any submarine that might fire it”. The joint US-South Korean naval base is staffed by American and South Korean naval special operation force personnel.

Fact Two: An Aegis ship-led US flotilla was operating in the South Korean waters in question at the time of the sinking of the South Korean warship.

Fact Three: The US flotilla included a mine-laying USNS Savor, stationed close to Baengnyeong Island.

Contrary to the belief that the ship was under the command of the Seventh Fleet, the NAM story noted that the USNS Salvor was “controlled by the innocuous-sounding Military Sealift Command and is closely connected with the Office of Naval Intelligence since their duties include secret operations such as retrieving weapons from sunken foreign ships, scouting harbor channels and laying mines, as when the Salvor trained Royal Thai Marine divers in mine-laying in the Gulf of Thailand in 2006, for example.”

Fact Four: The US Navy SEALs “maintains a sampling of European torpedoes for sake of plausible deniability for false-flag attacks. Also, Berlin does not sell torpedoes to North Korea, however, Germany does maintain a close joint submarine and submarine weapons development program with Israel.”

Chinese findings carry clout

The Chinese findings goes a long way to explaining why Obama made an April 1 phone call to offer South Korean President Lee Myung-bak the privilege of hosting in Seoul in 2012 a second of the then nuclear summit to be held in Washington April 12. (See See Pyongyang sees a US role in Cheonan sinking, Asia Times Online, May 5).

The offer was aimed at appeasing the embarrassed South Korean premier into covering up the truth of the US friendly fire sinking of the corvette, in a bid to prevent a tsunami-like nationwide eruption of anti-American sentiments and the resulting massive opposition to the US bases in South Korea and Japan.

South Korea is in no way fit to host such a a nuclear summit. Any one of the nuclear powers such as Russia, China, the United Kingdom and France should have been invited to host this dialogue’s second event.

The Chinese findings illustrate once again that two presidents, Obama and Lee, have no care for human lives and show that Lee wept crocodile tears over the death of his fellow countrymen sailors, using their loss to become a “a favorite man of Obama” in the words of US Vice President Joseph Biden.

The Chinese findings also explain why US Forces Korea Commander General Walter Sharp unexpectedly attended the April 3 funeral of a South Korean rescue diver, Han Ju Ho, who died while participating in the search for missing sailors from the corvette. Sharp was seen consoling the bereaved family in an unprecedented expression of sympathy.

Han Ju Ho was called a legendary veteran member of the South Korean underwater demolition team that took part in the covert ASW program of the joint US-South Korean base on Baengnyeong Island.

Now it is obvious why the US envoy in Seoul, Kathleen Stephens, and Sharp went out of their way on April 7 to fly to a South Korean amphibious landing ship to have a look at search and rescue operations for the sunken corvette.

The two pledged total support to the rescue operations, but as it turned out, the Americans showed how little the lives of South Korean soldiers matter to the US. South Korean troops are useful to the Americans as their cannon fodder, nothing more and nothing less.

The pro-American conservative South Korean daily Chosun Ilbo on April 1 wondered why the US SEALs aboard the USNS Savor did not join the South Koreans in the search and rescue operation as of March 31.

The daily expressed what it termed as “speechless” dismay at the refusal to dive by US SEALs who cited fast currents, low underwater temperatures, and deep waters, while the South Korean rescue team was left to struggle alone all the day against heavy odds.

The Los Angeles Times reported from Seoul May 28 on the South Korean public skepticism to the May 20 final forensic report on the sinking of the corvette: Younger South Koreans “see the Cheonan incident in less threatening terms. They contend that for all its bluster, North Korea is not an existential threat to their country. And they are suspicious of the motives of a conservative government they regard as descendants of the military regimes that ruled South Korea before it became a democracy in the 1980s.”

“The government is lying,” a 17-year-old high school student, Kim Da-yeon told the newspaper, wearing a Beatles T-shirt over her plaid school uniform, as her friends nodded with enthusiasm.

“The girls had stumbled on the demonstration in front of City Hall on a day off from school and picked Korean flags, but they said in unison that they didn’t agree with the anti-North Korean sentiment. “The North Koreans are our friends, our family,” they said, according to the newspaper report. “We don’t want to fight them.”


1.) Beijing suspects false flag attack on South Korean corvette, Online Journal, May 28.
2.) Did an American Mine Sink South Korean Ship? New American Media, May 27.

Kim Myong Chol is author of a number of books and papers in Korean, Japanese and English on North Korea, including Kim Jong-il’s Strategy for Reunification. He has a PhD from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Academy of Social Sciences and is often called an “unofficial” spokesman of Kim Jong-il and North Korea.

(Copyright 2010 Kim Myong Chol.)


Asia Times:

South Korea in the line of friendly fire

By Kim Myong Chol
May 26, 2010

[Editor’s note: North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has ordered his million-strong armed forces to “combat readiness”, according to a broadcast by the North Korean military. On Monday, South Korea announced it was suspending almost all trade links with North Korea in retaliation for the torpedoing of its warship Cheonan with the loss of 46 lives. The South has also banned all North Korean shipping from its waters and vowed to resume sensitive propaganda broadcasts across the Demilitarized Zone that were suspended in 2004.

“We do not hope for war but if South Korea, with the US and Japan on its back, tries to attack us, Kim Jong-il has ordered us to finish the task of unification left undone during the … (Korean) war (in 1953),” the military broadcast said.]

The South Korea-led multinational investigation team of the March

26 night sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan held a news conference in Seoul on May 20 to unveil its finalized forensic report with false findings pointing a finger at North Korea.

The report has all the hallmarks of rushing to invoke an all-too-familiar North Korean bogeyman in a bid to cover up the US role in a friendly fire incident.

The May 20 report is the only visible part of the iceberg-like “proof” that the South Korean people and the world public have all been lied to.

It is safe to state that the May 20 presentation is another lie of the century, as was the February 5, 2003, speech by the then-US secretary of state Colin Powell at the United Nations.

As the Powell speech paved the way for the invasion of Iraq by the US-led “coalition of the willing”, the May 20 report carries strong risks of trading charges quickly escalating into a nuclear war between two nuclear powers, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States.

CBS News reported on May 19 a significant Iraq War-like split among multi-national investigators: “The US, Britain and Australia – all of which helped in the investigation – are all prepared to back up the findings. Only Sweden, which also sent investigators, is a reluctant partner in blaming the North Koreans.”

The US, the United Kingdom and Australia were members of the “coalition of the willing”, whereas Sweden deeply opposed the invasion of Iraq. A major producer of AIP submarines, Sweden has vast expertise on shallow-water submarine warfare.

The Financial Times reported on May 19 on the skeptical reaction of the South Korean people:

Nevertheless, despite what appears to be the bloodiest North Korean attack for more than two decades, there has been no outpouring of public rage against Pyongyang. The loss of the warship has also exposed South Koreans’ mistrust of whatever the government says and a historic sense of fraternity with the North, feelings that can override strategic dangers.

The government seems to be hiding something. If not, why did it take so long to announce the conclusion?’ said Bae Sung-hoon, a 37-year-old office worker. Many ordinary South Koreans say that their government is merely seeking a convenient scapegoat for what was a mistake on the part of the South’s navy, or what was a “friendly fire” incident involving the US military.

A South Korean sister paper of the Washington Times, Segye Ilbo, on March 29 quoted a military source as saying: “The radar of the CIC on the corvette Cheonan is capable of easily detecting any torpedo within any radius of 20-30 kilometers but on that fateful day it detected no sign of a torpedo attack or naval firing by North Korea.

Japan’s conservative mass circulation daily Yomiuri Shimbun on March 21 quoted South Korean security experts as commenting, “Material evidence does not directly tally with the act of firing a torpedo. Absent is a perfect demonstration of the presence of a North Korean submarine and its launch of a torpedo. North Korea will likely counter-argue that South Koreans acquired a North Korean torpedo in a third country and launched it.”

Too clumsy to be a compelling case

The discovery of a given suspect’s weapon at the scene of crime does not establish his or her guilt because it could have been deliberately placed there by the true culprit to impute responsibility.

To establish the culpability of a suspect it is essential to satisfy at least three requirements. The first is demonstration of his or her presence at the time of the crime; corroboration of his or her actual use of the deadly weapon in question in perpetrating the crime; determination of how and why the suspect was able to get away.

As the three salient facts indicate, the final findings and accompanying pieces of evidence are so crudely crafted that they neither place North Korea at the scene of the tragedy nor establish North Korea’s guilt. The reason is obvious: the Americans and the South Koreans failed to study Perry Mason and Sherlock Holmes.

Firstly, the multi-national investigation did four things:

It identified that the cause of the sinking of the South Korean ship was a torpedo.
It disclosed that a few small North Korean submarines were out of their home port a couple of days before and after the ship disaster.
It produced fragments of what was purported to be a torpedo with markings in Korean scrip retrieved from the seabed.
It speculated that the torpedo was fired by a North Korean submarine.

The investigation team did not prove at all the presence of a North Korean submarine at the scene of the sinking at the time of one of the world’s greatest military exercises, as illustrated by telltale failures:

Failure to identify the name of a suspect small, primitive museum piece-like North Korean submarine and the names of its crew. A Toyota vehicle abandoned at the scene of a terrorist attack does not mean that either Japan or Toyota Motor Corporation was responsible for the action.

Failure to discuss the manner in which the suspected slow-moving North Korean submarine managed to penetrate South Korean waters, operate in shallow waters (depth of less than 30 meters) without being detected by the state-of-art radar and sonar-mounted US and South Korean ships and get away scot-free after the corvette sank in an explosion with a column of water so high (about 100 meters), so flashy and so noisy that a sentry on the shore of the Island of Baekryon witnessed it.

Failure to cite one of the world’s greatest war games that was going on at the scene. Yonhap reported on March 26 from Pyongtaek City on the west coast of South Korea that “The Foal/Eagle US-South Korean joint exercise is currently underway in the West Sea as US Aegis ships arrived May 25 at the Pyongtaek Naval Base where the Second Fleet is headquartered”.

Failure to discuss the presence in the war games on the fateful March 26 night of four Aegis ships, the USS Shiloh (CG-67), a 9,600-ton Ticonderoga class cruiser, the USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG-54), a 6,800-ton Arleigh Burke class guided-missile destroyer, the USS Lassen, a 9,200-ton Arleigh Burke class guided-missile destroyer and Sejong the Great, a 8,500-ton South Korean guided-missile destroyer, most probably supported by US nuclear and South Korean German Type 209 and 212 AIP submarines.

Failure to refer to the German explosives found at the wreckage of the corvette despite an initial announcement. The Korea Times reported on May 7, “The multinational investigation team is also closely looking into the possibility that a North Korean submarine fired a German-made torpedo used both by the South Korean and American navies in an attempt to dodge its responsibility.”

The Blue House (presidential house) was dismayed at the multinational investigators’ May 7 announcement that they had detected German RDX in the wreckage and pressured the Defense Ministry not to accept the findings, as Yonhap reported two days later.

Failure to explain the failure to find and retrieve two harpoon anti-ship missiles and a torpedo tube lost when the corvette sank, while succeeding in recovering the motor and propeller of the spent torpedo.

The investigation team produced what it termed “conclusive evidence”: the eye-catching hand-written Korean markings “ilbon” or “No 1” in English found on the propulsion section of the used torpedo allegedly recovered from the sea bed.

This turns out to be most inconclusive and counter-productive, calling into serious question the credibility of the findings. The use of “ilbon” in Korean script – not in Chinese characters – may look like North Korean writing, which is distinctly different from what is written in South Korea.

But native North Koreans use “ilho” for the English “No 1”. “Ilbon” is what South Koreans would use, although North Korean street addresses more often than often not do contain numerals like “ilbon”.

A likely theory for this blunder is the sense on the part of the investigators that there was an absence of hard evidence to impress a skeptical South Korean and world audience.

Disaster overrides key US policy objectives

A key policy objective of United States President Barack Obama and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak is to bring North Korea back to the six-party talks to persuade it to give up its nuclear arsenal and prevent it from exporting weapons.

They should be well informed that the May 20 forensic report carries four serious risks in its fallout.

Risk No1: The most effective high-profile global cost-free advertisement of the high performance of inexpensive weapons produced in North Korea.

The Yomiuri Shimbun on March 21 commented: “Weapons experts observe, ‘North Korean torpedoes are not less reliable than those deployed by Western countries.’ For North Korea, which earns foreign currency by exporting weapons, the sinking of the corvette is a good opportunity to demonstrate the performance of its domestically produced torpedoes, increasing their value as an export item.”

According to the SIPRI Yearbook 2005 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), North Korea exported 3,250 anti-tank missiles and 1,250 surface-to-air missiles(SAMs) to Russia between 1992 and 2005, and 45 Scud-C missiles (range 500km) to Yemen between 2001 and 2002.

Risk No 2: Embarrassing proof that the much-touted expensive and sophisticated US military hardware is a white elephant and that the US offer of a security guarantee to South Korea does not make any sense.

The world knows that air and sea supremacy and the presence of high-tech weapons are useless against small rag-tag insurgent forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Their one-dollar improvised explosive devices play havoc with eight-wheel armored combat vehicles, high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (Humvees) and mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles.

The net outcome will be reduced international demand for American weapons.

Risk No 3: Gone once and for all is the only small opportunity for North Korea to agree to return to the table for nuclear talks and renounce its nuclear arsenal.

Risk No 4: A sharpening of tensions on the Korean Peninsula has brought about a very explosive situation in which an armed clash may ignite hot war at any moment. The US is fighting two wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Obama administration appears to be opting for another war.

The Korean People’s Army has been put on combat readiness. Supreme Commander Kim Jong-il is one click away from turning Seoul, Tokyo and New York into a sea of fire with a fleet of nuclear-tipped North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Why have the two presidents put on the back burner their shared top policy priority objectives? What consideration has overridden them?

The answer is the urgent need to keep secret from the public that the tragic sinking of the corvette was a result of inadvertent friendly fire by a US nuclear submarine or an Aegis ship or any other naval ship. (See Pyongyang sees US role in Cheonan sinking Asia Times Online, May 5, 2010.)

Public knowledge of US friendly fire would generate a destructive bubble-jet effect of launching waves of anti-Americanism and attendant objections to US bases in South Korea, Japan and the rest of Asia, landing Obama and Lee in trouble. The latter would see his ruling party soundly defeated in June’s nationwide gubernatorial and municipal elections.

There is no other plausible explanation.

Kim Myong Chol is author of a number of books and papers in Korean, Japanese and English on North Korea, including Kim Jong-il’s Strategy for Reunification. He has a PhD from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Academy of Social Sciences and is often called an “unofficial” spokesman of Kim Jong-il and North Korea.

(Copyright 2010 Kim Myong Chol.)

Asia Times



The Sinking of the Cheonan: We Are Being Lied To

PCC-772 Cheonan: Photographic Evidence that “No. 1” Written on Top of Rust

###급급### 명박상넬아침 뇌진탕 되다 ~~ 사진이뭐길레

Pyongyang: Cheonan was false-flag sinking

South Korea in the line of friendly fire

“Attack against South Korean ship looks like false flag operation”

Did an American Mine Sink South Korean Ship?

South Korea’s Ship Sinking: Another False Flag?

False flags involving attacks on ships – prelude to war

It seems that it is too much of a coincidence that ship-related incidents have occurred before the USA entered into hostilities with other nations.

There was the USS Liberty false flag in which Israel planes and gun boats disguised as Arab attackers strafed, bombed and torpedoed the USS Liberty, an intelligence-gathering ship sailing off the Egyptian Coast.

Below is a pro-Israel lobbyist talking about setting up Iran so that the US could go to war with that nation.

Pro-Israel lobbyist suggests doing a false flag so that the US could go to war with Iran

VIDEO: Manufacture a false flag Dailymotion


“I pretty think that crisis initiation is really tough. And it’s very hard for me to see how the United States president can get us to a war with Iran. Which leads me to conclude that if in fact compromise is not company that the traditional way that America gets to war is what would be best for US’s interests.

Some people might think that Mr Roosevelt wanted to get us into WW2 as David mentioned. You may recall, we had to wait for Pearl Harbor.

Some people might think Mr Wilson wanted us to get into World War 1. You may recall we had to wait for the Lusitania episode.

Some people might think that Mr Johnson wanted to send troops to Vietnam, and you may recall we had to wait for the Gulf of Tonkin episode. We didn’t go to war with Spain until the USS Maine exploded.

And may I point out that Mr Lincoln did not feel he could call out the Federal Army until Fort Sumter was attacked which was why he ordered the commander of Fort Sumter to do exactly that thing in which the south Carolina incident said would cause an attack.

So if in fact the Iranians aren’t going to compromise, it would be best if somebody else started the war.

One can combine other means of pressure with sanctions. I mentioned that explosion on August 17th. We could step up the pressure. I mean, look people, Iranian submarines periodically go down. Some day one of them might not come up. Who would know why? We can do a variety of things if we wish to to increase the pressure.

I’m not advocating that, but I’m just suggesting that this is not an “either or” proposition. Just the sanctions has to succeed or other things. We are in the game of using covert means against the Iranians. We could get master of that.”


USS Liberty

When: June 8, 1967, at the time of the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War

Where: International waters off the Egyptian coast

How many killed/wounded: 34 killed, 174 wounded

USS Liberty: electronic intelligence-gathering ship

Mode of attack: Unmarked Israeli jets fired rockets and napalm at ship; Israeli aircraft blocked radio transmission; Israeli torpedo boats fired torpedoes and artillery at the ship, one torpedo struck the ship at the waterline level. Three lifeboats were launched but these were fired upon in contravention of international law. The attack lasted 3 days.

Motive: There are several theories as to the motive.

1. The attack was staged to conceal Israel’s pending seizure of Syria’s Golan Heights, which occurred the next day. If the ship had not been attacked, the ship’s listening devices would likely have overheard Israeli military communications planning this controversial operation.

2. The attack on the USS Liberty would be blamed on the Egyptians and the USA would be dragged into the war on Israel’s side.

Reasons to suspect the attack was deliberate

1. US flag was visible to attackers

Flag was flown on the ship and would have been visible to pilots flying the attacking Israeli jets. During the attack, a bigger flag was flown by the crew.

2. USS Liberty had been under Israeli surveillance

The USS Liberty was under surveillance by the Israelis for more than 9 hours before it was suddenly attacked without warning. Before the attack, Israeli jets flew over the USS Liberty hourly.

David Lewis of Lemington, Vt., was on the Liberty when it was attacked. In an interview, he said Israel had to know it was targeting an American ship. He said a U.S. flag was flying that day and Israel shot it full of holes. The sailors on the ship, he said, quickly hoisted another American flag, a much bigger one, to show Israel it was a U.S. vessel. FoxNews

3. Rescue aircraft turned back

Despite the blocking by Israeli aircraft, USS Liberty was able to make contact with the carrier Saratoga. 12 fighter jets and 4 tanker planes were sent to defend USS Liberty but they were turned back by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, for reasons that are unknown.

Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations at the time: “A cover-up”

It was “one of the classic all-American cover-ups,” said Ret. Adm. Thomas Moorer, a former Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman who spent a year investigating the attack as part of an independent panel he formed with other former military officials.


Israel’s response

Israel claims that it was a case of mistaken identity. They thought it was an Egyptian ship. However the ship that they claimed they mistook the USS Liberty for (El Quseir) is one-quarter of the weight of the USS Liberty, is half-the length and is of a different shape.

This explanation is not accepted by many servicemen on the USS Liberty.

Government response: a cover-up

Even though the Johnson administration never accepted the Israeli explanation, it never ordered an in-depth investigation. Many administration officers stated it was a deliberate attack. There are claims that the evidence was concealed and altered to cover up the attack. The USS Liberty Veterans Association filed a Report of War Crimes document with the Secretary of the Army, providing evidence that the attack was a crime under international law. The US Government is supposed to investigate these allegations under international law and treaties, of which the U.S. is a signatory. The US Government has not even acknowledged the filing of the report, much less carried out the obligatory investigations.

Testimonies of Israeli pilot and Israeli major show the attack was deliberate

1. A senior Israeli pilot approached the Liberty survivors and told them about his role in the attack. In addition, he had extensive interviews with former Congressman Paul N. McCloskey. This pilot stated that he recognized the ship as an American one immediately and informed his headquarters about it. They told him to ignore the American flag and to continue the attack on the ship. He refused to do so. On returning to the base he was arrested.

2. An Israeli major (a dual Israeli-American citizen) told survivors of the USS Liberty attack that he had been in an Israeli war room at the time of the attack, and had heard the Israeli pilot’s report by radio that the ship was American. The attacking pilots, as well as everyone in the war room, knew that they were attacking an American ship, the major reported. However, the Israeli major later recanted his statement after he allegedly received threatening phone calls from Israel.

Other evidence that the attack was deliberate

The pilot’s protest that the ship was American had been picked up by radio monitors in the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon. U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Dwight Porter confirmed that he had heard the pilot’s protest that the ship he was attacking was American on radio. The ambassador then told his story to two syndicated columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, and he offered to be interviewed on this matter by the U.S. authorities. However, nobody in the U.S. government has taken him up on this offer.

Soviet ship was first to offer help

Ironically, the Soviets, an enemy of the USA at that time, who were patrolling nearby were the first to offer aid to the USS Liberty after it had been attacked by a supposed ally. The offer was refused and it was only after 16 hours from the time of the attack that American ships arrived at the ship. By that time, 34 people had died and 174 injured.

Crew told to keep hush

While the wounded were being evacuated, one of the first things the crew were told by officers of Naval Intelligence was not to talk about the attack to the press.

Israel broke ceasefire next day

The next day Israel launched a surprise attack on Syria, which broke the cease-fire agreement. It was in this attack that the Israelis seized control of the Golan Heights.

Israel quickly exonerated

Within 3 weeks, the Navy issued an exoneration of the Israelis. The Navy claimed everything had been a huge mistake. The Navy also said that the Israelis had pulled back as soon as they had realized their mistake. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara said the whole affair should be forgotten, stating that “These errors do occur.”

Images of USS Liberty Attack (WRH)


Torpedo hole in USS Liberty

selquseir2 (1).jpg

El Quseir: Israel claims the USS Liberty was mistaken for the Egyptian horse carrier El Quseir


USS Liberty: According to a 1981 NSA report on the incident, the El Quseir “was approximately one-quarter of the Liberty’s tonnage, about one-half its length, and offered a radically different silhouette.” WRH

USS Liberty Int-5

The assault was initiated by French-built high-performance Mirage jets armed with cannon and rockets. Later, slower Mystere jets (at arrow in this photograph taken by McGonagle) followed up with napalm and more rockets.

USS Liberty Int-331

After the ship was disabled by aircraft cannon, rockets and napalm, Israeli torpedo boats were sent in.

USS Liberty Int-21

USS Liberty Int-21d

Crew’s mess hall used as an emergency room

USS Liberty Int-1

Liberty deck crew resting after recovering bodies of shipmates

USS Liberty Int-12

30mm cannon holes

USS Liberty Int-8

30mm cannon holes

USS Liberty documentary

VIDEO: The USS Liberty Attack In A Nutshell Youtube


USS Liberty Memorial

THIS DAY IN HISTORY: 1967 Israel attacks USS Liberty

FOX News: Ex-Navy Official: 1967 Israeli Attack on U.S. Ship Was Deliberate


Cover-Up Alleged in Probe of USS Libertyhttp://www.whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/ussliberty.html

Gulf of Tonkin

When: There were two alleged attacks:

  1. August 2, 1964 (not disputed)
  2. August 4, 1964 (disputed)

Where: International waters off North Vietnam

Motive: To get America into the Vietnam War

Summary of the events: Two attacks were claimed to have happened. The first one did occur but it was Vietnamese vessels that suffered the most damage. The second attack that was said to have happened two days later was a fabricated attack.

  1. The August 2 attack by the North Vietnamese naval forces: The media covered up the fact that the U.S. was already involved in military action in the Vietnam War, and misled the public into thinking this attack was entirely unprovoked. The ship that was attacked, USS Maddox, was providing support to the South Vietnamese military against the North. At the time of the attack it was doing a patrol.
  2. The alleged August 4 attack by the North Vietnamese naval forces: This was a fabricated attack. The North Vietnamese denied they attacked the US warships Maddox and Turner Joy. No evidence from the archives or personal accounts refute these claims.

Result of the deception: Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that served as the legal justification for President Johnson send U.S. conventional forces to Vietnam. (Special forces had already been deployed in the conflict.)

As a result of the US involvement in the war, over 50,000 U.S. military personnel died, and over 2 million Vietnamese civilians perished in this conflict, which lasted nine years (1964-1973).

Uncovering the deception:  

The below is adapted from Stripes.com Faulty intel at the Gulf of Tonkin would set the US into war by Edward J. Marolda

The Gulf of Tonkin Deception in detail


Gulf of Tonkin

United States was engaged in a secret war with North Vietnam

The United States had been working against North Vietnam secretly for the last 10 years, about which North Vietnam was fully aware.

The first alleged attack

On August 2, 1964, the destroyer USS Maddox, which was in the Gulf of Tonkin, intercepted a message from North Vietnam’s naval HQ. The message was an instruction for North Vietnamese naval forces to prepare for battle.

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USS Maddox

Herrick, commander of the USS Maddox, informed his superiors. USS Maddox resumed its patrol of the North Vietnamese coast in international waters.

At 1400, Herrick was told by intelligence that North Vietnam would carry out a torpedo attack on the ‘enemy’.

USS Maddox was moving away from the coast when its radar spotted some fast-moving vessels closing in rapidly on the ship.

Around 1530, Herrick told the command of the Seventh Fleet and USS Ticonderoga about the approaching North Vietnamese vessels and that he intended to fire in self-defense if needed.

Some US jets immediately headed for Maddox’s location.

The vessels approaching Maddox were identified as 3 P-4 torpedo boats. At 1605, USS Maddox fired rounds from the ship’s guns as a warning, but they had no effect. As the three North Vietnamese boats kept approaching, the USS Maddox opened fire in earnest. In response, the North Vietnamese vessels launched torpedoes, and fired their guns, and then turned away. The torpedoes missed their target and only one round from the guns hit the destroyer, lodging harmlessly in the superstructure of the destroyer.

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USS Turner Joy

The North Vietnamese boats were not so lucky. One boat was heavily damaged, and its commander was killed. Ticonderoga’s planes arrived and fired cannons and rockets on the three boats, leaving one boat on fire in the water. Despite the damage, the three North Vietnamese boats made it back to shore.

The second alleged attack two days later

In response to the attack, President Johnson ordered the destroyers USS Maddox and Turner Joy to go back to patrolling near the North Vietnamese coast on August 4. This was to demonstrate American military strength.

At this point, the stories of the North Vietnamese and the Americans diverge.

According to the Americans, radars on the two American warships picked up high-speed contacts to the northeast. The destroyers were ordered to move away from the fast-approaching contacts. When one contact was 7,000 yards from the ships, the captain of Turner Joy ordered the gunners to fire.

For the next two hours, the destroyers maneuvered to evade these attackers. US aircraft flew overhead the ships. Some time later, the two ships rejoined the main fleet.

Based on Herrick’s reports and information obtained from intelligence stations in the western Pacific, Johnson concluded that North Vietnam had once again attacked American warships in international waters.

And this was the narrative that was believed for many years.


Newspaper headline at the time

The story of the second attack unravels

However, it is now apparent that the second attack, on August 4, never occurred.

Hanoi has maintained all along that its navy did not attack the American ships on August 4.

Weaknesses of the official story from Washington:

• NSA misinterpreted the intercepted North Vietnamese radio transmissions that were said to show Hanoi’s intention to attack US ships

• eyewitness accounts of men on the American ships and planes were inconclusive

• Navy’s own operational reports revealed the information that had been gathered on the supposed attack were imprecise and contradictory

Johnson (1965): “For all I know, our navy was shooting at whales out there.”

No archival records or personal accounts have ever refuted North Vietnam’s contention that its forces did not attack US warships on Aug. 4.

President Johnson capitalizes on the deception to do a “revenge attack”

President Johnson, using the August 2 attack (attack is not disputed) and the August 4 attack (attack is disputed) as the justification, ordered the US navy to execute retaliatory attacks by air on August 5.

President Johnson vows retaliation against North Vietnam in a speech

67 aircraft from destroyers Ticonderoga and Constellation sank or damaged 33 North Vietnamese vessels and 90% of the fuel storage facility at Vinh. One American died from anti-aircraft fire.

This was the start of the war that would rage on for nine years (1964–1973).

USA formally enters the war

On August 7, the USA’s entry into the war was formalized with a resolution passed in Congress (with only two dissenting votes) that declared the US military would be used to frustrate Hanoi’s ambitions in Southeast Asia.

American advisers and special forces personnel had already been fighting and dying in the region for years, but now the conflict was moved from being kept secret into the open.


Vietnam under war


Faulty intel at the Gulf of Tonkin would set the US into war

Pearl Harbor


Where: Pearl Harbor, Hawaii

When: December 7, 1941 at 7 a.m.

Attack: Japanese attacked the naval base at Pearl Harbor in a surprise attack.

Human losses: 2,403 Americans were killed; 1,178 were wounded

Materiel losses: 353 fighter planes, bombers and torpedo planes attacked the base.
These planes were launched from 6 aircraft carriers.
Eight battleships were damaged and 4 were sunk.
The Japanese also sank or damaged 3 cruisers, 3 destroyers, a training ship and 1 minelayer.
188 aircraft were destroyed.
(However, the fuel storage facility, torpedo storage facility, power station, shipyard, HQ building were not attacked.)

December 8: the day after Pearl Harbor, the US declared war on Japan.
December 11: Germany and Italy declared war on the US. (Japan and Germany and Italy had a mutual defense pact). The US declared war on Germany and Italy.

Nature of the conspiracy: 

President Franklin D Roosevelt (FDR):

1. Provoked the attack
2. Knew about the attack in advance
3. Failed to warn the commanders in Hawaii about it

Motive: The public and Congress were against US involvement in the war. The Pearl Harbor attack gave FDR an excuse to take the US into war.

How the conspiracy was done 


1. He did not pass on the relevant intelligence to Hawaii headquarters that warned of an attack. Pearl Harbor commanders could not prepare for an attack.

2. He gave wrong information to people. i) He misled commanders into thinking the negotiations with the Japanese were still ongoing as late as November 27 (10 days before the attack) although by that time they had failed. This led the forces to not take the necessary steps to guard against the attack. ii) He gave false information about the location of the Japanese carrier fleet sent to Hawaii.



The Pearl Harbor Deception

(Robert B. Stinnet, a World War II veteran, has written a book called “Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor” (2000). Stinnett obtained much of the information from documents that were released through the Freedom of Information Act. Much of the information below is obtained from this book.)

The following is adapted from the article: “New American: Pearl Harbor: Hawaii Was Surprised; FDR Was Not” by James Perloff.

FDR wanted a war with Japan – secret communications with Churchill



Roosevelt had wanted the US to join the war for a long time.

A close advisor was sent in Jan 1941 to tell Churchill that the US wanted to join the war on England’s side:

“The President is determined that we [the United States and England] shall win the war together. Make no mistake about it. He has sent me here to tell you that at all costs and by all means he will carry you through, no matter what happens to him — there is nothing he will not do so far as he has human power.”

FDR war plans were discovered

These secret communications between Churchill and FDR were found by Tyler Kent, a code clerk at the US embassy in London. He tried to smuggle them out to America to inform the American public about FDR’s intentions, but he was blocked from doing that when he was caught and kept in a British jail until the end of the war.

Roosevelt deliberately provoked the Axis powers to attack the USA

1. Provocations aimed at Germany:

  • FDR froze Germany’s assets
  • 50 destroyers were sent to Britain
  • He depth-charged German U-boats.

When Germany did not retaliate, FDR switched over to provoking Japan. The reason was that Japan had a mutual defense pact with Germany and Italy. If Japan entered into a war with the USA, Japan’s allies, Germany and Italy, would automatically be pulled into fighting against USA. So the USA would be at war in the Pacific theater and the European theater if the scheme was successful.

2. Provocations aimed at Japan

Actions that were thought to provoke Japan to attack the USA were outlined in a memorandum by Arthur McCollum, a commander in Naval Intelligence. All eight were put into practice as well as some additional ones.

The actions in the memo included:

i. Freezing Japanese assets
ii. Closing the Panama Canal to Japanese ships
iii. Halting vital exports to Japan, culminating in a total embargo against it
iv. Sending notes to the Japanese warning of what would happen if Japan did not change its policies in the Pacific.
v. Delivering an ultimatum to Japan on November 26 that Japan withdraw all troops from China and Indochina or be attacked

Diary notes reveal FDR wanted Japan to make the first move

Henry Stimson, Secretary of War

Henry Stimson who was Secretary of War under FDR, wrote in his diary:

“We face the delicate question of the diplomatic fencing to be done so as to be sure Japan is put into the wrong and makes the first bad move — overt move.”

This showed that the US was committed to entering the war, but wanted to do it in such a way so that it would seem it was forced into war.

And on November 25, the day before the ultimatum was sent, he wrote:

“The question was how we should maneuver them [the Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot….”

The Pacific Fleet was used as bait for the Japanese


Admiral James O. Richardson, Commander in Chief

The Pacific Fleet was placed in Pearl Harbor as bait for the Japanese. Placing the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor was firmly opposed by Admiral Richardson, the fleet’s commander. His reasons for opposing this were the same reasons the Pacific Fleet would make good bait for the Japanese.

Richardson’s arguments:

1. Pearl Harbor could be approached from any direction
2. Pearl Harbor could not be rigged with nets and baffles for protection against torpedo planes.
3. Training and supplying crews would be difficult because of its distant location from the mainland.
4. Fuel supplies on Pearl Harbor were insufficient and there were too few dry docks.
5. Morale problems would be high among servicemen as they would be far from their families.

However, FDR would not budge and he ended up relieving Richardson of his command and replacing him with Admiral Husband Kimmel.

This led Richardson to believe that FDR was determined to put the US to war:

“I came away with the impression that, despite his spoken word, the President was fully determined to put the United States into the war if Great Britain could hold out until he was reelected.”

Japanese code cracked: “Purple” and “Magic”


Japanese coding and decoding machine

The US had cracked Japan’s secret messaging code called “Purple”. After cracking the code, the Americans made a copies of the encoding and decoding machines. The deciphered messages were known as “Magic”.

Copies of deciphered messages were sent to FDR, the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, Army Chief of Staff, and Chief of Naval Operations.

But none of the coding/decoding machines were sent to Pearl Harbor even though a Japanese embassy was located in Pearl Harbor.

Any messages that were intercepted had to be sent first to Washington for decoding, which meant a delay in messages reaching Hawaii.

On October 9, a Tokyo-to-Honolulu dispatch was decoded that instructed the Japanese Consul General to divide Pearl Harbor into five specified areas and to report the exact locations of American ships. This message showed the Japanese was gathering information for an attack on Pearl Harbor.

But this information was never sent to Kimmel.

Additional intercepts gave warning of an attack

Additional intercepts were decoded by Washington, all within 24 hours of their original transmission:

• November 5th: Tokyo notified its ambassadors in Washington that November 25th was the deadline for an agreement with the U.S.

• November 11th: Japanese ambassadors in Washington were warned, “The situation is nearing a climax, and the time is getting short.”

• November 16th: More messages were received. The deadline was pushed up to November 29th. “The deadline absolutely cannot be changed,” the dispatch said. “After that, things are automatically going to happen.”

• November 29th (by then the U.S. ultimatum had now been received by the Japanese): The ambassadors were told a rupture in negotiations was “inevitable,” but that Japan’s leaders had to conceal their knowledge of this fact. They were instructed to avoid giving “the impression that negotiations are broken off.”

• November 30th: Tokyo ordered sent a message to its embassy in Berlin to inform the Germans that “the breaking out of war may come quicker than anyone dreams.”

• December 1st: The deadline was again moved forward. To hide this fact, in order”[T]o prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious” the press was advised that the negotiations were continuing. 

• December 1st-2nd: The Japanese embassies in non-Axis nations around the world were directed to dispose of their secret documents and all but one copy of their codes. (When war breaks out, the diplomatic offices of a hostile state lose their immunity and are normally overtaken. One copy of code was retained so that final instructions could be received, after which that last code copy would also be destroyed.)

The famous “East wind, rain” message


Artwork by Mary Beth Percival for the cover of a book written about Pearl Harbor called “East Wind Rain”

‘A November 18th intercept indicated that if a break in U.S. relations were forthcoming, Tokyo would issue a special radio warning … The message, to be repeated three times during a weather report, was “Higashi no kaze ame,” meaning “East wind, rain.” “East wind” signified the United States; “rain” signified diplomatic split — in effect, war.

This prospective message was deemed so significant that U.S. radio monitors were constantly watching for it, and the Navy Department typed it up on special reminder cards. On December 4th, “Higashi no kaze ame” was indeed broadcast and picked up by Washington intelligence.’

FDR would have known war with Japan was imminent

FDR knew that Japan had in her history attacked other nations without warning, including the breaking off of diplomatic relations.

Secretary Stimson recorded FDR’s warning of an attack made at a conference

Secretary Stimson, describing FDR’s White House conference of November 25th, noted:

“The President said the Japanese were notorious for making an attack without warning and stated that we might be attacked, say next Monday, for example.”

Naval messages kept secret from Pearl Harbor commanders

Washington had access to the Japanese naval messages as well as diplomatic messages that had been decoded. These messages were kept so confidential that their existence was hidden from the ten Pearl Harbor investigations that were done.

Many decoded messages not released under the FOIA

Most of author Stinnett’s requests for documents relating to these intercepted naval messages have been denied, even under the Freedom of Information Act.

This is probably because the information in these naval messages is damaging to the Roosevelt administration. They may show he had foreknowledge of the attack but did not act on it.

Many decoded messages speaking of coming attack intercepted

Naval intelligence intercepted and translated numerous dispatches, some clearly revealing that Pearl Harbor had been targeted. The most significant was the following, sent by Admiral Yamamoto to the Japanese First Air Fleet on November 26, 1941 (11 days before the attack):

“The task force, keeping its movement strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the United States fleet and deal it a mortal blow. The first air raid is planned for the dawn of x-day. Exact date to be given by later order.”

Because of the secrecy surrounding the Japanese naval dispatches, it is not known whether this message was seen by McCollum (director of the Office of Naval Intelligence’s Far East Asia section and responsible for providing messages of Japanese intercepts to FDR) or FDR.

Other warnings

January 27th, 1941: The US ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, warned Washington that he had heard from a Peruvian Minister that Pearl Harbor could be the target of a surprise attack at the outbreak of hostilities

November 3rd, 1941: Grew notified Secretary of State Cordell Hull: “War with the United States may come with dramatic and dangerous suddenness.”

November 17th, 1941: Grew sent another warning of a Japanese attack

Early in 1941: Congressman Martin Dies warned the Secretary of State that he had come into possession of a map that showed that the Japanese had attack plans for Pearl Harbor. In response Hull told Dies that he had shown the map to FDR and he asked Dies to keep this map a secret.

More evidence of foreknowledge

Yugoslavia secret agent

A Yugoslavian secret agent who worked for both Germany and Britain (his true allegiance was to the Allies) revealed he had been ordered to make a detailed study of Pearl Harbor. He guessed this was for a surprise attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor. He warned J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI. Hoover revealed later that he passed this warning onto FDR who told him to keep the information confidential.

Korean underground warning

A Korean member of the Sino-People’s League, Kilsoo Haan, warned the State Department that the Korean underground had received word that the Japanese were planning to assault Hawaii before Christmas. After getting nowhere with the State Department, Haan told Iowa Senator Guy Gillette about this warning. Gillette briefed the president, who said he would look into it.

Dutch Army in Java

The Dutch Army stationed in Java, Indonesia, decoded a message from Tokyo to the Japanese embassy in Bangkok about future attacks on four sites including Hawaii. This message was passed onto Washington.

Dutch naval attache

Dutch naval attache in Washington was shown the progress of Japanese ships toward Hawaii on December 2 and 6. He assumed that everyone in Honolulu knew an attack was coming.

Secretary of State Cordell Hull

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Secretary of State Cordell Hull

Secretary of State Cordell Hull, worried that the Japanese were about to attack Pearl Harbor and FDR was allowing it to happen, passed on copies of the Japanese message intercepts concerning Pearl Harbor to a newspaper journalist Joseph Leib, hoping he would leak them to the media. Leib was only able to get only one newspaper to carry it.

(For additional evidences, see “Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath” by John Toland, and “Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor” by Robert Stinnett.)

Only one of the numerous warnings reached Kimmel, commander of Pearl Harbor


Admiral Husband Edward Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet at the time of Pearl Harbor

There was so many warnings that Chief of Staff General George Marshall at a private press conference in November confidently predicted that a Japanese-American war would break out during the “first ten days of December.”

None of this intelligence, except one rumor, was passed onto commanders in Hawaii.

Ambassador to Japan Grew’s January warning reached Kimmel on February 1st. However, he was told by Lieutenant Commander McCollum to ignore the rumor.

Sitting Ducks

Other actions that Washington took to ensure the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor unimpeded:

1) Creating a traffic-free path for Japanese ships to sail to Pearl Harbor: The US Navy issued an order forbidding US and Allied ships to travel via the North Pacific.

2) Blocking Kimmel and Short from doing protecting the fleet in Pearl Harbor: The commanders were given insufficient planes to do a surveillance around Pearl Harbor despite requests for more planes. They were told to search the wrong area.

Rear Admiral Edward T. Layton, who served at Pearl Harbor, summed it up in his book “And I Was There”:

“There was never any hint in any intelligence received by the local command of any Japanese threat to Hawaii. Our air defenses were stripped on orders from the army chief himself.”

Washington ordered Kimmel to return the fleet’s ships back to dock

Kimmel put 46 war ships in the fleet to sea as a precaution since it is a rule of the Navy that when international relations are critical, ships were put to sea. Kimmel also did a mock air raid.

But White House told him to send the ships back.

Kimmel’s efforts to guard the fleet with a task force of guard ships were thwarted

Kimmel then tried to set up a 25-ship task force to guard the fleet from enemy attack, but he was thwarted ‘when on November 26th, Admiral Stark, Washington’s Chief of Naval Operations, ordered carriers be sent to transport fighter planes elsewhere.

Washington covered their backs by sending vague warnings

Washington sent an ambiguous “war warning” to Kimmel, and a similar one to Short, on November 27th. This has been used for years by Washington apologists to accuse the Pearl Harbor commanders of being negligent.

The warnings were misleading. In one, they named the wrong targets of attack: the Philippines, Thailand, Kra Peninsula or Borneo. They also misled about the nature of the attacks: warnings about sabotage and amphibious (submarine) attacks were sent.

The two commanders in Hawaii took actions to protect against these threats and reported them to Washington. These actions actually made the fleet vulnerable to air attack but the commanders had not been warned about air attacks.

Japan intended to sever relations with the US on December 7th

Japan sent a dispatch to its ambassadors in Washington, telling them to inform Washington Japan was severing relations with Washington. This message was tantamount to declaring war on America. This message was intercepted. 13 parts out of this 14-part message were decrypted – that is, everything except for the severing relations part. However, the 13 parts that had been decrypted were so fiery that it was obvious Japan intended to end relations with the United States and possibly declare war.

‘Later that day, when Lieutenant Lester Schulz delivered to President Roosevelt his copy of the intercept, Schulz heard FDR say to his advisor, Harry Hopkins, “This means war.”‘

Meeting held at the White House

FDR convened a high-level meeting at the White House that evening. That same evening, the Navy Department received a request from Stimson for a list of the whereabouts of all the ships in the Pacific.

Morning of December 7th, day of the attack

On the morning of December 7th, the final portion of Japan’s lengthy message to the Japanese ambassadors was decoded. There were two directives in the message:

1) The statement about severing the relations with America was to be delivered by them at 1 p.m. (1 p.m. Washington time was 7 a.m. in Hawaii; Pearl Harbor was attacked just before 8 a.m.).

2) The last copy of the code (previous copies had already been destroyed earlier on instruction), and the coding/decoding machine that went with it, had to be destroyed.

From this message it could be assumed that Japan planned to strike Pearl Harbor at dawn of December 7th (there was a time difference of 6 hours between Washington and Honolulu).

Admiral Stark did not notify Pearl Harbor of coming attacks

Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, arrived at his office at 9:25 a.m (3:25 a.m. in Honolulu). He was shown the message, but he did not take action to notify Kimmel, probably because he had been instructed by Roosevelt not to warn Hawaii:

‘One junior officer pointed out the possibility of an attack on Hawaii; another urged that Kimmel be notified. But Stark refused; he did nothing all morning. Years later, he told the press that his conscience was clear concerning Pearl Harbor because all his actions had been dictated by a “higher authority.” As Chief of Naval Operations, Stark had only one higher authority: Roosevelt.’

Washington delayed sending the warning to Hawaii 

  • Secretary of War was out riding horses and couldn’t be reached.
  • Marshall dawdled on his trip back to his office: a 10-minute drive took 75 minutes
  • Instead of making a phone call to Pearl Harbor, a written dispatch was sent

As a result of all of these delays, General Short,  received it 6 hours after the Japanese attack, and Admiral Kimmel got it 8 hours after the attack.


General Walter Short, commander responsible for defense of military installations in Hawaii

“In the War Department, where the 14-part statement had also been decoded, Colonel Rufus Bratton, head of the Army’s Far Eastern section, discerned the message’s significance. But the chief of intelligence told him nothing could be done until Marshall arrived. Bratton tried reaching Marshall at home, but was repeatedly told the general was out horseback riding. The horseback ride turned out to be a long one. When Bratton finally reached Marshall by phone and told him of the emergency, Marshall said he would come to the War Department. Marshall took 75 minutes to make the 10-minute drive. He didn’t come to his office until 11:25 a.m. — an extremely late hour with the nation on the brink of war. He perused the Japanese message and was shown the delivery time. Every officer in Marshall’s office agreed these indicated an attack in the Pacific at about 1 p.m. EST. The general finally agreed that Hawaii should be alerted, but time was running out.


Gen. George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the US Army

FDR pretended he had tried to forestall the attack

FDR sent a last-minute plea for peace to Emperor Hirohito that was sent on the evening of December 6th, but it was too late to reach the emperor before December 8th. The message had been written a week before.

Corrupt commission on Pearl Harbor blamed Pearl Harbor commanders for failures

After the Pearl Harbor attack, a commission headed by personal cronies of Roosevelt and Marshall was set up. The commission absolved Washington of blame and accused Kimmel and Short of “dereliction of duty”.

Adapted from “New American: Pearl Harbor: Hawaii Was Surprised; FDR Was Not” (James Perloff)


A U-boat torpedo hit ocean liner Lusitania near Britain and some 1200 people, including 128 Americans, on board lost their lives. Subsequent investigations revealed that the major explosions were inside the Lusitania, as it was secretly transporting 6 million pounds of artillery shells and rifle ammunition, as well as other explosives on behalf of Morgan banking corporation to help their clients, the Britain and the France. It was against US laws to transport war materials and passengers in the same ship. 911 Review


The Lusitania



Travellers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her allies and Great Britain and her allies; that the zone of war includes the water adjacent to the British Isles; that, in accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain, or any of her allies, are liable to destruction in those waters and that travellers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk.

Imperial German Embassy, Washington, D.C., April 22, 1913

The Germans gave a warning to Americans not to sail on the Lusitania as there was a chance they would attack it. So they asked for this notice to be printed in 50 newspapers. But the Government did not pass on the warning to the general public except for allowing this notice to be printed in only one regional newspaper. 

On April 22, [the Germans] ordered a conspicuous warning placed in fifty newspapers near the Cunard sailing notices, alerting potential passengers to the danger. This would have given the public a week’s notice. However, a State Department officer ordered the warning’s publication suppressed. On April 26, George Viereck, representing the Germans, obtained an audience with Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan. Bryan immediately cleared the notice for publication, and also urged President Wilson to warn Americans. Wilson, however, always on the bankers’ puppet strings, declined to do so.  False Flag at Sea: The Lusitania …

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President Wilson by the time he was in office was in the clutches of the bankers; here he is with House, one of his “minders”.


Churchill wanted the US to enter the war and was prepared to use the lives of American civilians to achieve that; Churchill as head of the Admiralty was an instrumental figure in the Lusitania deception. 


A German U-boat

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Survivors and the dead from the Lusitania on a lifeboat

A detailed account of the Lusitania incident giving the political background and the machinations behind the scene is here: “False Flag at Sea: The Lusitania, Woodrow Wilson, and the Deceptions that Dragged America into World War I” by James Perloff


Article Dump

Gulf of Tonkin

Faulty intel at the Gulf of Tonkin would set the US into war

In the early morning hours of Aug. 2, 1964, naval intelligence personnel manning communications interception equipment on board destroyer USS Maddox, then steaming on a peacetime mission in the Gulf of Tonkin, straightened in their chairs as they listened to a transmission from North Vietnam’s naval headquarters. The communication instructed naval forces to prepare for battle.

Capt. John J. Herrick, the officer in tactical command for the Maddox mission, sent a top-priority “flash” precedence message to his superiors stating: “contemplate serious reaction my movements [off North Vietnam] in near future. Received info indicating possible hostile action.”

Thus began an incident that some observers have considered the spark that ignited the long, contentious and ultimately unsuccessful Vietnam War that cost the lives of 58,000 Americans and changed the course of U.S. history.

Maddox headed out to sea until daybreak Aug. 2, but then resumed her north-south patrol of the coast in international waters. Shortly after noon, the ship’s radar and lookouts identified various fast attack craft gathering around a small nearby island.

About 1400 (H time, or Saigon time), Herrick learned from intelligence that these forces had been ordered to carry out a torpedo attack on the “enemy.” Since the United States had been working against North Vietnam with Hanoi’s arch enemy South Vietnam for the last 10 years, Herrick had no doubt whom the “enemy” might be. As the destroyer speeded up to 27 knots and steered east and then southeast to clear the area, radar locked onto several fast-moving vessels closing on her.

At 1530 Maddox sounded General Quarters, and soon afterward Herrick alerted Commander Seventh Fleet and aircraft carrier USS Ticonderoga that his ship was “being approached by high speed craft with apparent intention of torpedo attack.” He added, “intend to open fire if necessary [in] self defense.” A quartet of F-8E Crusader jets, armed with missiles, rockets and cannons, immediately headed for Maddox’s location 280 miles to the northwest and 25 miles from North Vietnam.

Meanwhile, Maddox had positively identified the contacts as three Soviet-built P-4 torpedo boats traveling at 50-knot speeds and closing the ship on an intersecting course. At 1605 the destroyer fired three rounds from one of her 5-inch/38-caliber guns as a warning; they had no effect. The three North Vietnamese boats (T-333, T-336, and T-339) of Torpedo Squadron 135 continued to close. Finally, at 1608 Maddox opened fire in earnest with her 5-inch and 3-inch guns. The attacking vessels turned to port, launched torpedoes, fired their 14.5mm deck guns and turned away astern of the destroyer. The North Vietnamese torpedoes missed their target and only one 14.5mm round hit the destroyer, where it lodged harmlessly in the superstructure.

The attackers did not fare as well.

Maddox’s gunfire heavily damaged T-339, killing its commander. Shortly afterward, Ticonderoga’s Crusaders arrived overhead and unloaded their 5-inch Zuni rockets and 20mm cannons on the three boats, leaving one dead in the water and burning. Despite damage from the U.S. fire, the North Vietnamese boats later managed to make it back to shore. In the meantime, Maddox joined Ticonderoga at the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin.

Surprised by the North Vietnamese action, President Lyndon B. Johnson suggested that an overly aggressive local naval commander might have ordered the attack. Neither Johnson nor most of his military and civilian advisers believed North Vietnamese leaders would openly challenge America’s military might. To demonstrate that the United States would not back down in such a confrontation, Washington ordered Maddox, now accompanied by destroyer USS Turner Joy, to resume the patrol along the North Vietnamese coast on Aug. 4.

Beginning at 2041 on the dark, cloudy night, radars on the ships picked up high-speed contacts to the northeast. Herrick directed the destroyers away from what he thought were fast-approaching hostile vessels. When one contact was tracked as close as 7,000 yards to the ships, the captain ordered Turner Joy to open fire. For the next two hours, the destroyers, with aircraft overhead, maneuvered to evade their supposed attackers. At the end of the confusing episode, the two ships rejoined the fleet.

Buttressed by Herrick’s reports and by information from intelligence stations in the western Pacific, Johnson and his advisers concluded that North Vietnamese naval forces had once again attacked American warships in international waters. The wealth of information obtained from national intelligence sources and from the Navy then and for years afterward convinced many objective observers that North Vietnam had brazenly attacked U.S. ships on the open sea.

It is now clear, however, that an attack never occurred.

The National Security Agency misinterpreted intercepted North Vietnamese radio transmissions suggesting an attack; eyewitness accounts by some of the men on the destroyers and in the planes proved inconclusive; and the Navy’s operational reports revealed some of the information gathered to be imprecise or contradictory. Moreover, the Tonkin Gulf Incident happened 50 years ago and neither archival records nor personal accounts have surfaced in Vietnam or the United States to refute Hanoi’s unchanged contention that its navy did not attack on Aug. 4.

There was no doubt, however, that North Vietnamese torpedo boats had attacked Maddox on Aug. 2. Knowing this, and convinced that a similar action had occurred two days later, Johnson ordered U.S naval forces to execute retaliatory air strikes on Aug. 5. On that date, 67 combat aircraft from Ticonderoga and Constellation sank or damaged 33 North Vietnamese naval vessels and destroyed 90 percent of the fuel storage facility at Vinh. Anti-aircraft fire brought down the plane piloted by Lt. Richard C. Sather, the first American aviator to die in the conflict against North Vietnam. The Pierce Arrow strike was the first major episode of an air campaign that would continue off and on for nine more years.

Of even greater significance, the events off North Vietnam in early August 1964 prompted many Americans to call for retribution against Hanoi and to rally around the Johnson administration. On Aug. 7, Congress passed, with only two dissenting votes, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution that essentially authorized Johnson to use the U.S. Armed Forces as he saw fit to frustrate Hanoi’s ambitions in Southeast Asia. American advisers and special forces personnel had been fighting and dying in the region for years, but the Tonkin Gulf Incident proved to be a milestone in the long struggle.

The United States was now embarked on major combat operations that would last until the end of the war in January 1973.

Edward J. Marolda, who completed a 40-year career in the U.S. federal government, served as the director of U.S. Naval History (Acting) and Senior Historian of the Navy. He graduated from Pennsylvania Military College in 1967 with a Bachelor of Arts in History and served as a U.S. Army officer in Vietnam from 1969-1970. He completed a master’s degree at Georgetown University in 1971 and a Ph.D at George Washington University in 1990. He is overseeing a commemorative series on the U.S. Navy and the Vietnam War for the Naval Historical Foundation and authored the first issue, “The Approaching Storm: Conflict in Asia, 1945-1965.” He is also an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University presenting a course on the U.S. and China in the Cold War.

The above is adapted from Stripes.com “Faulty intel at the Gulf of Tonkin would set the US into war” by Edward J. Marolda


Faulty intel at the Gulf of Tonkin would set the US into war